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THE CASE FOR AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
QUALITY IN SALES OF COMMERCIAL
REAL ESTATE
FRONA M. POWELL*
JANE P. MALLOR**
Over the past twenty years, numerous courts and commentators have
chronicled the demise of the caveat emptor doctrine in real property
transactions.' Developments such as the creation of an implied warranty
of quality in sales of new residential property,2 the expansion of circum-
stances under which vendors have the duty to disclose defects in prop-
erty,3 and the widespread acceptance of an implied warranty of
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business.
** Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business.
1. See, eg., Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14
VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961); Grand, Implied and Statutory Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate: The
Demise of Caveat Emptor, 15 REAL EsT. L.J. 44 (1986); Note, Commercial Law-Implied Warran-
ties in Sales of Real Estate-The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 510 (1972)
[hereinafter The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor]; Comment, Home Sales: A Crack in the Caveat
Emptor Shield, 29 MERCER L. REv. 323 (1977) [hereinafter Home Sales].
2. For discussion of the development of this implied warranty, see generally Bearman, supra
note 1; Grand, supra note I; Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965); Tennille, Remedies for Defective New Homes in California: A
Framework for Statutory Change, 9 W. ST. U.L. REV. 23 (1982); Note, Liability of the Builder-
Vendor Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability-Where Does it End?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV.
593 (1979); Note, Implied Warranties in New Home Sales-Is the Seller Defenseless?, 35 S.C.L.
REv. 469 (1984) [hereinafter Is the Seller Defenseless?]; Note, Defective Housing: Remedies Available
to the First and Subsequent Purchasers, 25 S.D.L. REV. 333 (1980) [hereinafter Defective Housing];
Note, Breach of Warranty in the Sale of Real Property: Johnson v. Healy, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 727
(1980). For discussion of related bases of builders' liability for defective homes, see Cherry, Negli-
gence: An Expanding Cause of Action Against Builders for Used Home Defects, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 167
(1988); Note, Strict Liability in Tort for Builder-Vendors of Homes, 24 TULSA L.J. 117 (1988) [here-
inafter Strict Liability for Builders]; Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability Doctrine in Residen-
tial Property Conveyances: Policy-Backed Change Proposals, 62 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1987)
[hereinafter Policy-Backed Change Proposals].
A growing number of states have extended the reach of the implied warranty of habitability to
purchasers of relatively new used homes. See infra note 68.
3. For discussion of the traditional rule and recent trends, see generally Goldfarb, Fraud and
Non-Disclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8 W. RESERVE L. REV. 5 (1956); Kafker, Sell and
Tell: The Fall and Revival of the Rule on Nondisclosure in Sales of Used Real Property, 12 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 57 (1986); Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1936); Note, When the Walls Come Tumbling Down-Theories of Recovery for Defective Housing,
56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 670 (1982) [hereinafter When the Walls Come Tumbling Down]; Note, Real
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habitability in residential leases' evidence the doctrine's erosion. These
developments acknowledge the bankruptcy of caveat emptor's "optimis-
tic creed"5 that the parties have equal knowledge and bargaining power
in transactions involving the sale of residential property.' However, the
doctrine remains viable in other situations. There is no consensus among
courts about whether the underlying assumptions of caveat emptor are
tenable in the sale of commercial or investment property.
Although the application of an implied warranty of quality is now
widespread in the sale of new homes,8 relatively few courts have consid-
ered whether implied warranty protection should extend to purchasers of
commercial property. Of these courts, some have rejected the applica-
tion of the warranty based on the assumption that a purchaser of com-
mercial property is capable of acting for his own protection.9 Other
courts, minimizing the significance of the purchaser's investor status,
have held that an implied warranty of quality applies in sales of commer-
cial as well as residential property.10 This Article will demonstrate that
an implied warranty of quality should be imposed in sales of commercial
Property-Seller's Liability for Nondisclosure of Real Property Defects: Johnson v. Davis, 14 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 359 (1986); Note, Property-Caveat Emptor-Duty to Disclose Limited to Commercial
Vendors, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 547 (1981); Home Sales, supra note 1; Note, Johnson v. Davis: New
Liability for Fraudulent Nondisclosure in Real Property Transactions, 11 NOVA L.J. 145 (1986). See
also Goforth, Sales of Structurally Defective Homes: The Potential Liability of Sellers and Real Es-
tate Brokers, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 447 (1988) (discussing the expansion of brokers' and sellers' liability
for fraudulent misrepresentation).
4. See, eg., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). See also Mallor, The Implied Warranty of Habitability and the 'Non-Merchant'
Landlord, 22 DuQ. L. REV. 637, 637 n.3 (1984) (reporting that at least 40 jurisdictions have adopted
the implied warranty of habitability by statute or judicial decision and listing jurisdictions that had
done so as of 1984)..
5. Professor Kessler used this term to describe the ideology underlying freedom of contract.
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLuM. L. REV.
629, 630-31 (1943).
6. See, e.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1968). See Is the Seller Defense-
less?, supra note 2, at 470.
7. The term "commercial property" will be used throughout this Article to mean improved
real property that is used for any income-producing purpose, including commercial, industrial, and
investment purposes.
8. For a list of states that had adopted the implied warranty of habitability as of 1984, see Case
Note, Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability-Contract Language Stating No Warranties,
Express or Implied, is Effective Disclaimer of Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability in Sale of
New House by Builder-Vendor, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 673, 679-80 n.27 (1984). See also Conklin v.
Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 656 n.2 (Fla. 1983) (listing jurisdictions adopting the warranty as of 1983).
9. See infra notes 79-123 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 124-46 and accompanying text.
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property and will make recommendations about the application of such a
warranty. Part I examines the evolution, policies, and scope of the im-
plied warranty of habitability as that warranty has applied to sales of
residential property. Part II examines the divergent approaches that
courts have used in cases concerning sales of commercial property. Part
III then evaluates whether the rationales supporting the implied war-
ranty of habitability apply in sales of commercial property, and contends
that they do. Finally, the Article proposes standards for the application
of an implied warranty of quality tailored to the issues likely to confront
courts with respect to sales of commercial property.
I. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN SALES OF
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
A. Evolution of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
The erosion of the caveat emptor doctrine in the sale of goods was
underway by the early twentieth century,11 but the doctrine still domi-
nated real property transactions in many states well into the 1960s. 12
Although courts occasionally applied an implied warranty of workman-
like construction to builders in construction contracts, 13 these warranties
did not extend to the sale of structures. Despite the tremendous surge of
housing development following World War II, courts commonly held
that in the absence of an express warranty or a misrepresentation, even
professional builder-vendors bore no legal responsibility for the quality
or fitness of the structures they sold. 4 Moreover, even a vendor who
made express warranties in his contract with the purchaser might escape
liability under a separate but related doctrine called the merger doc-
trine. 5 Under the merger doctrine all agreements entered prior to the
11. See Strict Liability for Builders, supra note 2, at 119-27 (discussing the evolution of strict
liability in tort).
12. M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1.2(n), at 30-32
(3d ed. 1975); Bearman, supra note 1, at 542; Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TEX. L. REV.
439 (1960); When the Walls Come Tumbling Down, supra note 3, at 682-83.
13. See, eg., Busker v. Sokolowski, 203 N.W.2d 301 (Iowa 1972); Smith & Nelson v. Bristol, 33
Iowa 24 (1871). See also Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1884) (implied warranty
applied to builder of bridge). For further discussion of the early use of implied warranties in con-
struction contracts, see Comment, Extension of Implied Warranties to Developer-Vendors of Com-
pleted New Homes, I1 URBAN L. ANN. 257, 262 n.19 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Tudor v. Heugel, 132 Ind. App. 579, 178 N.E.2d 442 (1961). See The Trend to
Abolish Caveat Emptor, supra note 1, at 514 n.23, however, for a discussion of alternative theories of
relief sometimes used by courts before the emergence of implied warranties.
15. The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, supra note 1, at 512.
1990]
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execution of a deed were presumed to have been merged in the deed. 6
Thus, an express warranty stated in the contract but omitted from the
deed would often be of no effect after the delivery of the deed. 7
The caveat emptor and merger doctrines were both premised on the
purchaser's ability to discover and protect himself against defects in
property. 18 It is not surprising, then, that the first exception to those
doctrines involved situations in which the purchaser did not have the
ability to protect himself by prior inspection. In the late 1950s, Ameri-
can courts began to create and apply an implied warranty of quality that
did not merge into the deed when a purchaser bought a house that was
still under construction at the time of sale. 9 In this initial period of
development of the implied warranty, courts carefully distinguished sales
of houses still under construction from sales of completed houses on the
grounds that the buyer of a completed house had the ability to inspect
the structure or bargain for express warranties.2 °
Critics soon attacked the validity of this distinction, arguing that the
16. See D. WHALEY, WARRANTIES AND THE PRACTITIONER 228-29 (1981); 7 S. WILLISTON,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 926, at 798-99 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1963) (stating that "after
delivery and acceptance of a deed in performance of a contract for the purchase and sale of land the
deed is regarded as the final expression of the agreement of the parties and the sole repository of the
terms on which they have agreed"). See also When the Walls Come Tumbling Down, supra note 3, at
685 n.73 (observing that the purpose of the merger doctrine was to facilitate certainty in real prop.
erty transactions by ensuring that only one document contained all the limitations on the transaction
in question); The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, supra note 1, at 512 (observing that the merger
doctrine helped to prolong the life of the caveat emptor doctrine).
17. Courts developed several exceptions to the merger doctrine, however. A provision of the
contract of sale would survive the delivery of the deed, for example, if it created rights that were
"collateral" to the deed (le., unrelated to title, possession, and like matters). See M. FRIEDMAN,
CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 7.2, at 781-84 (4th ed. 1984). In recent
years, courts have held that express and implied warranties of quality are collateral and do not
merge into the deed. See id. at 786.
18. The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, supra note 1, at 511. See also J. LIEBERMAN, TH E
LrrIGIOUS SOCIETY 39 (1981) (essential prerequisite of caveat emptor was knowledge of risk); Com-
ment, The Case Against Strict Liability Protection for New Home Buyers in Ohio, 14 AKRON L. REv.
103, 106-07 (1980).
19. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Jones v. Gatewood,
381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
English courts had applied an implied warranty of workmanlike construction to sales of unfinished
houses some 20 years earlier. See Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (1931); Perry v.
Sharon Dev. Co., 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A. 1937) (house substantially completed).
20. See, e.g., Fain v. Nelson, 57 Wash. 2d 217, 356 P.2d 302 (1960) (no implied warranty of
fitness in sale of apartment building; warranty applies only to sale of buildings under construction;
purchaser was experienced with apartment buildings and did not inspect). See also Kirk v. Ridgway,
373 N.W.2d 491,493-94 (Iowa 1985); The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, supra note 1, at 515-17.
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purchaser of a completed structure is equally unable to detect defective
conditions.21 The complexity of houses together with the average home
buyer's relative lack of expertise can make inspection relatively meaning-
less. Even if the homebuyer employs an expert to inspect the house,
many defects are undetectable after completion of the structure.22 Crit-
ics also argued that the purchaser of a completed structure is in no better
position than the purchaser of an uncompleted structure to protect him-
self by negotiating an express warranty. Both may be inexperienced, un-
counseled laymen who do not recognize the need for contractual
protection. Or both simply may lack the bargaining power to negotiate
the clause. For these reasons, courts came to see the distinction between
these two transactions as untenable.23
In the 1964 case of Carpenter v. Donohoe,24 Colorado became the first
state to abandon the distinction between uncompleted and completed
homes and to recognize an implied warranty of quality in the sale of a
completed home. Over the next decade, most states' courts followed suit,
rejecting the caveat emptor and merger doctrines in sales of new homes
by builder-vendors and creating instead a guarantee of quality usually
called the implied warranty of habitability or the implied warranty of
workmanlike construction.25
B. Rationales for Implied Warranty Protection
The logic and rhetoric of the product liability revolution fueled courts'
decisions to extend implied warranty protection to sales of completed
homes. A judge who imposes strict liability on a seller of goods because
of the inherent disparity in knowledge, control, or bargaining power be-
21. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, § 1.2, at 58; Bearman, supra note 1, at 545.
22. M. FRIEDMAN supra note 17, § 1.2, at 58; Note, The Implications of Implied Warranty
Protection for Used Housing-Gaito v. Auman, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 515, 518 (1986).
23. See, eg., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964). One commentator
points out that a builder-vendor who built two houses at the same time for sale and happened to sell
one before completion would be responsible to that purchaser for a defect in the house, but would
not be responsible for defects in the second house if the purchaser bought it immediately after com-
pletion. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, § 1.2, at 58. See also Bearman, supra note 1, at 544-46
(criticizing the distinction between newly completed housing and uncompleted housing).
24. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
25. See, e.g., id.; Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1985); Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C.
51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974); Jeanguneat v. Jackie Hames Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1978). See
supra note 8.
The terms "implied warranty of habitability" and "implied warranty of workmanlike construc-
tion" are apparently synonymous. See, eg., infra notes 44-46.
1990]
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tween the seller and a buyer26 will likely find it inconsistent to apply the
caveat emptor doctrine when a buyer in the same disadvantaged position
invests much more money in real property. The fact that many of the
defendants in the early implied warranty cases were mass builders al-
lowed courts to forge a link to product liability principles. Courts made
a persuasive analogy between the relationship of builder-vendor and pur-
chaser and the relationship of manufacturer and consumer.27 Although
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) are inapplicable to
sales of real property,2 8 courts often suggest that the implied warranty of
habitability is analogous to a warranty of merchantability in the sale of
goods. 29 The analogy seems especially appropriate when new houses are
mass produced by a builder-vendor regularly engaged in the business of
selling new homes.30
Perhaps the most compelling rationale for creating implied warranties
in the sale of new homes is that the purchaser is forced to rely on the skill
and integrity of the builder.31 Caveat emptor's assumption that a pur-
chaser is capable of protecting himself by inspecting the structure might
have been reasonable in an earlier time, when structures were simpler.
Today, however, the complexity of houses makes it very difficult for most
laymen to detect hidden defects. Many defects that might exist in a mod-
em house are virtually impossible for a diligent purchaser or even a pro-
fessional inspector to discover, particularly when the defect exists in
some part of the construction that has been sealed or in the structure's
26. The basic dichotomy between a "relatively sophisticated and financially powerful seller
dealing with a relatively unsophisticated and financially weak consumer respecting a product whose
capacities for inflicting injury are often hidden" provides the rationale for the expansion of products
liability law. Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability- With a Close Look at Section 402A and
the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439, 440 (1969).
27. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
28. UCC § 2-102 (1987) provides in part that "[u]nless the context otherwise requires, this
Article applies to transactions in goods."
Older cases typically rejected plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts to urge the creation of implied warranties
in the sale of real property by analogizing them to warranties in the sale of personal property. See,
e.g., Murphy v. Sheftel, 121 Cal. App. 533, 9 P.2d 568 (1932).
29. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 Ill. App. 3d 260, 427 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (1981). See D.
WHALEY, supra note 16, at 232 (the warranty of habitability is "kissing kin" to the warranty of
merchantability)..
30. Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., Inc., 76 I11. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
31. See, e.g., Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 91, 115 Cal. Rptr.
648, 651 (1974); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1974); Licciardi v. Pascarella,
194 N.J. 381, 476 A.2d 1273 (1983). See also Bearman, supra note 1, at 574; Policy-Backed Change
Proposals, supra note 2, at 745-47.
[Vol. 68:305
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foundation.32
In contrast, the builder has superior knowledge of the details regarding
the site preparation, materials, and building practices used in the con-
struction process, 33 and a better opportunity to avoid defects. 34 Builder-
vendors encourage the purchaser's reliance by holding themselves out as
having superior expertise.35 If that reliance is misplaced, the purchaser
stands to suffer great damage. As courts often note, the purchase of a
house is usually the largest single purchase of a person's lifetime.36
Another rationale for implying a warranty of quality in the sale of real
property is that it facilitates the reasonable expectations of the parties.37
A purchaser of improved real property usually bargains primarily for
structures on the land which are fit for their ordinary uses, and he has
certain reasonable expectations about the durability and quality of those
structures. 38 Because many buyers either do not realize the need to bar-
gain for an express warranty or cannot effectively negotiate contractual
protection against defective construction, imposing an implied warranty
against defects may be the only way to ensure that the purchaser receives
that for which he bargained. This is especially true when the parties use
a standardized form contract which minimizes the purchaser's opportu-
nity to negotiate warranty protection.39
In addition, the implied warranty of habitability is based on the ration-
ale that a builder-vendor is usually better able to bear the risk of latent
defects in the property than is a purchaser. The builder-vendor has the
32. Bearman, supra note 1, at 545.
33. See, eg., George v. Veach, 67 N.C. App. 674, 680, 313 S.E.2d 920, 923 (1984); House v.
Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 435, 457 P.2d 199, 204 (1969).
34. See, eg., Conyers v. Molloy, 50 II. App. 3d 17, 19, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988 (1977); George, 67
N.C. App. at 680, 313 S.E.2d at 923-24 (1985).
35. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 398, 271 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1980).
36. See, eg., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 67, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (1966); Moxley v.
Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979).
37. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 649-50, arguing that the implied warranty is the implicit un-
derstanding of the parties that when a fair price is paid, the buyer should receive a building that is
reasonably fit for its ordinary purposes. He notes that "since one does not give money in exchange
for illusory value ... the law should read this term into the contract as one which is implied in fact."
Id. at 650.
38. See, e.g., Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. 1972) (en bane)
("Although considered to be a 'real estate' transaction because the ownership to land is transferred,
the purchase of a residence is in most cases the purchase of a manufactured product-the house.
The land involved is seldom the prime element in such a purchase, certainly not in the urban areas of
the state.").
39. See Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971).
1990]
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opportunity to insure against the risk of defects and to distribute the cost
through increased prices." On the other hand, a purchaser who must
make costly repairs as a result of a defect unknown at the time of
purchase will have no means of distributing those costs, unless he has
insurance that covers the particular risk.
Finally, courts creating the implied warranty of habitability wanted to
encourage minimum standards of safety and quality in new construction.
While most of the injuries purchasers suffer in connection with defective
real property are purely economic, defective construction also presents a
potential threat to life and health.41 Implied warranties operate to dis-
courage "jerrybuilding" and the resulting risk of personal injuries, as
well as to improve the quality of new construction. 2
Although almost all of the cases establishing the implied warranty of
habitability in the sale of completed structures involved residential prop-
erty, this Article contends that the rationales supporting the warranty's
creation are equally applicable to sales of commercial real estate.
C. The Nature of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
The implied warranty of habitability is an extracontractual duty
placed on those in the business of building or selling real property.43 The
warranty requires that a house sold by such an individual comply with
community standards of workmanlike construction" and be fit for
human habitation. 5 The warranty imposes a form of strict liability on
the builder; the complaining party need not establish negligence even in
40. See, e-g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 87, 207 A.2d 314, 323 (1965). See also
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 140-41 (2d ed. 1977).
41. See Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 230, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976).
42. See, eg., Gaito v. Auman, 70 N.C. App. 21, 27, 318 S.E,2d 555, 559 (1984); Humber v.
Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (rex. 1968).
43. The duty is limited to those who are in the business of building or selling real property. See
infra note 71.
44. See, eg., Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 318-19, 214 N.W.2d 925, 926 (1974) (contrac-
tor impliedly warrants that "the building will be erected in a workmanlike manner and in accord-
ance with good usage and accepted practices in the community"); Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51,
62, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974) (vendor in the business of selling dwellings impliedly warrants that
"the dwelling, together with all its fixtures, is sufficiently free from major structural defects, and is
constructed in a workmanlike manner, so as to meet the standard of workmanlike quality then
prevailing at the time and place of construction").
45. See, eg., Columbia Western Corp. v. Vela, 122 Ariz. 28, 33, 592 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Ct. App,
1979); Lyon v. Ward, 28 N.C. App. 446, 450, 221 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1976) ("a builder-vendor im-
pliedly warrants to the initial purchaser that a house and all its fixtures will provide the service or
protection for which it was intended under normal use and conditions").
[Vol. 68:305
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states in which the warranty is described as a guarantee of workmanlike
construction.46 The duration of the warranty is usually measured by a
standard of reasonableness that takes into account the parties' reasonable
expectations about the durability of the structure and its fixtures.4 7
The implied warranty of habitability does not guarantee perfection,
however. It protects only against latent defects, not against known de-
fects or those that would be visible upon inspection by a reasonable pur-
chaser.4" The latency requirement is based on considerations of freedom
of contract; it is fair to presume that a buyer purchasing obviously defec-
tive property is willing to accept the deficiency because of an attractive
46. See, eg., Degnan v. Executive Homes, Inc., 215 Mont. 162, 166, 696 P.2d 431, 433 (1985)
("theory behind the implied warranty of habitability is not one of fault or wrongdoing"); George v.
Leach, 67 N.C. App. 674, 678, 313 S.E.2d 920, 922 (1984); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407,
414, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1970). See Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1045
(Colo. 1983) (en bane) (distinguishing implied warranty of habitability claims from negligence
claims). In a few cases, courts have permitted plaintiffs to maintain cases against builder-vendors
premised on strict liability in tort, even when the plaintiffs' sole injury was economic. See 13lagg v.
Fred Hunt Co., Inc., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74
Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969). But see Bernstein v. Ainsworth, 220 Neb. 670, 371 N.W.2d 682 (1985) (ven-
dor of improved lot could not be held strictly liable for damages resulting from defects in lot which
caused it to be susceptible to flooding).
One issue arising frequently is whether the cause of action lies in contract or tort. The resolution
of this issue is important for purposes such as issues of proof, determination of the applicable statute
of limitations, and application of attorney fees provisions in sales contracts. Most courts have held
that the action lies in contract. See, e.g. Woodward v. Chirco Constr. Co., 141 Ariz. 520, 687 P.2d
1269 (1984) (en banc); Cosmopolitan Homes, 663 P.2d at 1045; Cabal v. Donnelly, 302 Or. 115, 727
P.2d 111 (1986). But see Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 376, 378-79,
433 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1982) (cause of action arising from failure to perform in a workmanlike man-
ner lies in tort because the duty is imposed by law rather than by contract). See generally Note, The
Implied Warranty of Habitability-Contract or Tort?, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 207 (1979). One court
held, however, that willful and wanton conduct in breaching the implied warranty of habitability can
constitute an independent tort and give rise to a claim for punitive damages. Morrow v. L.A. Gold-
schmidt Assoc., Inc., 126 Il. App. 3d 1089, 468 N.E.2d 414 (1984).
47. See, eg., Wagner Constr. Co., Inc. v. Noonan, 403 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980);
George, 67 N.C. App. at 680, 313 S.E.2d at 924. Cf. Gaito v. Auman, 70 N.C. App. 21, 318 S.E.2d
555 (1984) (warranty protected first purchaser of five-year-old home; house considered "new" for
purposes of warranty throughout the duration of the ten-year statute of limitations period).
Some states have enacted statutes of repose that limit the period of time during which a builder
may be vulnerable to claims. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20-2 (West Supp. 1987-88).
48. See, eg., Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 245, 678 P.2d 427, 430 (1984)
(en banc); Fischer v. G & S Builders, 147 Ill. App. 3d 168, 175-76, 497 N.E.2d 1022, 1027 (1986);
Briarcliffe W. Townhomes Owners Ass'n. v. Wiseman Constr. Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 402, 405, 480
N.E.2d 833, 835 (1985); Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., Inc., 290 N.C. 185, 200, 225 S.E.2d 557,
567 (1976).
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price.4 9 In addition, the implied warranty of habitability protects only
against relatively substantial defects.5 0 As a general rule, the complaint
must relate to design or workmanship defects that render the property
unsuitable for its intended use.51
L Disclaiming the Implied Warranty of Habitability
After courts recognized the implied warranty of habitability, they had
to address whether vendors could disclaim the warranty, and if so, what
language would suffice as a disclaimer.52 Like its cousin in the sale of
goods, the implied warranty of habitability is an implied obligation aris-
ing out of the parties' contract but imposed by law for reasons of sound
public policy. One could argue that just as a seller of goods can disclaim
the implied warranty of merchantability relatively easily,53 a builder-ven-
dor of a new home should be able to disclaim the implied warranty of
49. See Cosmopolitan Homes, 663 P.2d at 1045-46. For an analogy in the law of sales, see
U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (1987) (implied warranties are disclaimed as to discoverable defects when the
buyer examines the goods as fully as he desires or refuses to examine the goods before entering into
the contract).
50. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415 P.2d 698, 711 (1966). See also Abrams v.
Rapoport, 163 Ill. App. 3d 748, 516 N.E.2d 943 (1987) (unusual noises emanating from room not
sufficient to show breach of warranty).
51. See Dann v. Perrotti & Hauptman Dev. Co., 670 P.2d 448 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (fact that
tenants could not occupy condominiums because of the absence of an occupancy permit did not
constitute a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, where no proof of defect in property;
warranty of habitability not intended to remedy procedural defects). Cf. Hinson v. Jefferson, 287
N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975) (implied warranty of habitability guaranteed that land conveyed
subject to restrictive covenants could be used in accordance with the limited uses specified in the
covenants).
52. As one court put it, "[w]here an implied warranty is recognized, can the disclaimer be far
behind?" Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Il1. App. 3d 17, 19, 364 N.E.2d 986, 989 (1977). For a general
discussion of contract disclaimers in the sale of real property, see Abney, Disclaiming the Implied
Real Estate Common-Law Warranties, 17 REAL EST. L.J. 141 (1988); Anderson, Disclaiming the
Implied Warranties of Habitability and Good Workmanship in the Sale of New Houses: The Supreme
Court of Texas and the Duty to Read the Contracts You Sign, 15 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 517 (1984);
Larson, The "As Is" Disclaimer and the Sale of New Houses, 13 REAL EsT. L.J. 238 (1984); Note,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability in the Sale of New Homes: Disclaiming Liability in Illinois,
1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 649.
53. Section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which lays down the ground rules for
exclusion and modification of warranties of quality, provides that express disclaimers of the implied
warranty of merchantability must mention the word "merchantability" and, if in writing, must be
conspicuous. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1987). It further provides that notwithstanding the preceding re-
quirements, implied warranties can be disclaimed by language that by common understanding points
the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties (e.g., "as is," "with all faults"), by the buyer's full
inspection or refusal to inspect when there is a discoverable defect, and by course of dealing, course
of performance, or usage of trade. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (1987). See generally Weintraub, Disclaimer of
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habitability by including an appropriate term in the contract.54
Courts agree that the implied warranty is disclaimable." They disa-
gree, however, on what constitutes an adequate disclaimer.56 Relatively
few courts have enforced generally worded disclaimers of the "as is" or
"in its present condition" variety."7 At the opposite extreme, a few
courts have applied such exacting standards of specificity to the dis-
claimer that, despite their assertions, the warranty seems disclaimable in
theory only.5"
Warranties and Limitation of Damages for Breach of Warranty Under the UCC, 53 TEx. L. REV. 60
(1974).
Most courts now hold that the disclaimer of implied warranties is further bounded by the concept
of unconscionability. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987), which provides tlbAt "[i]f the court as a matter of
law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract ... " (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979) (similar language). Even a disclaimer that follows the rules
of§ 2-316 can be ineffective if it is unconscionable under the circumstances of a particular case. See,
e.g., Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985). See generally Phillips, Uncon-
scionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CM-KENT L. REV. 199 (1985).
54. For example, this argument was made by the defendant builder in Schoeneweis v. Herrin,
110 Ill. App. 3d 800, 805, 443 N.E.2d 36, 40 (1982).
55. See, eg., Country Squire Homeowners Ass'n. v. Crest Hill Dev., 150 Ill. App. 3d 30, 501
N.E.2d 794 (1986). See Conyers, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 22, 364 N.E.2d at 990 ("No court has yet held
that disclaimers are against public policy although they have not been favored and are frequently
unsuccessful in disclaiming the implied warranty.").
56. Compare, eg., Colsant v. Goldschmidt, 97 Ill. App. 3d 53, 54-56, 421 N.E.2d 1073, 1075-
76, (1981) (contract language "[b]uilder does not assume responsibility for any ... damages caused
by any defects" not sufficient to disclaim implied warranty; burden on seller to show buyer knew he
was signing a disclaimer) with G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. 1982), over-
ruled by Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987) (contract language that
there are "no ... warranties, express or implied" sufficient to disclaim implied warranty; buyer has
obligation to read what he signs). A recently enacted Indiana statute codifies the conditions under
which a disclaimer of implied warranties will be effective. IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-4-20.5-9 (West
Supp. 1987-88).
The mere fact that the vendor gives an express warranty would not disclaim the existence of
implied warranties. Like warranties in the sale of goods, warranties in the sale of real property are
cumulative. Wingfield v. Page, 278 Ark. 276, 644 S.W.2d 940 (1983); Hoagland v. Celebrity Homes,
Inc., 40 Colo. App. 215, 572 P.2d 493 (1977); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972); Bridges v. Ferrell, 685 P.2d 409 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
57. Even in the sale of residential property to a consumer purchaser, a court may give prefer-
ence to the principle of freedom of contract and the purchaser's duty to read what he signs and find
an effective waiver of the implied warranty. See Bankston v. McKenzie, 287 Ark. 350, 698 S.W.2d
799 (1985) (vendor not liable for defect where property sold "as is"); Perrett v. Dollard, 176 Ga.
App. 829, 338 S.E.2d 56 (1985) ("as is" disclaimer enforceable); Tibbits v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d
442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967) (disclaimer clause stating that the buyer accepted property "in its present
condition" sufficient to disclaim the implied warranty). See also Case Note, supra note 8.
58. See, e.g., Belt v. Spencer, 41 Colo. App. 227, 228, 230, 585 P.2d 922, 923, 925 (1978)
(language of contract provided for one-year express warranty "except for cracking of concrete fiat-
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Most courts find themselves somewhere in the middle. They maintain
that the principle of freedom of contract gives parties the freedom to
allocate risks, but recognize that imbalances in bargaining power, knowl-
edge, and sophistication between a builder-vendor and purchaser can
make this freedom illusory for the purchaser.5 9 As a result, courts con-
sider such factors as the conspicuousness, clarity, and specificity of the
disclaimer,' the purchaser's subjective knowledge and understanding of
the term,61 and the relative sophistication and bargaining power of the
parties6 2-in short, the same factors that courts consider in determining
whether any harsh term in a contract between unequal parties is
unconscionable.63
Courts regard disclaimers of the implied warranty of habitability with
intense suspicion when the purchaser is an ordinary consumer. Courts
may be more willing to give effect to such provisions if the parties are
commercial investors, however.64 If a purchaser is sophisticated enough
work"; exclusion ineffective where concrete heaved rather than cracked); Casavant v. Campopiano,
114 R.I. 24, 28-29, 327 A.2d 831, 833-34 (1974) (language in contract that purchasers agree to take
premises "in the same condition in which they are now" not sufficiently specific; sellers liable for
damages caused by defective roof). These cases involved substantial structural defects.
59. See Abney, supra note 52, at 142.
60. Courts have held that the disclaimer clause should be conspicuous or at least written in
such a way that one can fairly conclude that the purchaser has read the clause. See, e.g., Briarcliffe
W. Townhomes Ass'n. v. Wiseman Constr. Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d. 402, 480 N.E.2d 833 (1985) (war-
ranty can be waived only by conspicuous and clear language specifically disclaiming the implied
warranty of habitability; burden is on vendor to prove that purchaser knew the implied warranty did
not attach to the sale; disclaimer ineffective unless brought to the attention of the purchaser and
agreed to by him); Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1980). See also
Swaw v. Ortell, 137 Ill. App. 3d 60, 484 N.E.2d 780 (1984); Shoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 Il1. App. 3d
800, 443 N.E.2d 36 (1982); Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. 11, 476 A.2d 427 (1984). Furthermore, the
disclaimer should be specific, clear and unambiguous, easily understood, and concise. Belt v. Spen-
cer, 41 Colo. App. 227, 585 P.2d 922 (1987); Hesson v. Walmsley Constr. Co., 422 So. 2d 943 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Tusch Enter. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Herlihy v. Dunbar
Builders Corp. 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224 (1980); Tassan, 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.
2d 902; Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Ill. App. 3d 17, 20-21, 364 N.E.2d 986, 989 (1977); Griffin v.
Wheeler-Leonard & Co., Inc., 290 N.C. 184, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976).
61. See, eg., Briarcliffe, 134 Ill. App. 3d. 402, 480 N.E.2d 833; Colsant v. Goldschmidt, 97 Ill.
App. 3d 53, 421 N.E.2d 1073 (1981); Ecksel v. Orleans Constr. Co., 360 Pa. Super. 119, 519 A.2d
1021 (1987).
62. See, eg., Colsant, 97 Ill. App. 3d 53, 421 N.E.2d 1073; Casavant v. Campopiano, 114 R.I.
24, 327 A.2d 831 (1974). For a more thorough discussion of the features of a valid disclaimer of the
implied warranty of habitability, see Abney, supra note 52, at 142-50; Larson, supra note 52, at 244-
46.
63. See Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065, 1070-73
(1986).
64. See, eg., Shapiro v. Hu, 188 Cal. App. 3d 324, 233 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1986) ("as is" provision
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to protect himself by negotiating favorable contract terms or inspecting
the property,65 a court may conclude that the freedom of contract princi-
ple outweighs the policies underlying an implied warranty of habitability.
The court therefore might accord greater deference to apparently volun-
tary contractual allocations of the risk of defects.
2. Expansion of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
As with most newly created doctrines, the contours of the implied
warranty of habitability are constantly being tested and defined. Now
that the implied warranty is widely recognized, most cases reaching the
appellate courts today challenge its scope. Given the broad application
of the rationales that support the implied warranty, courts have tended
to expand its coverage rather than limit it to the facts of the "first genera-
tion" cases.66 Courts have steadily enlarged both the range of transac-
tions in which the implied warranty applies and the content of the
warranty. Courts have held that the warranty exists not only in initial
sales of newly constructed single family houses and condominiums,67 but
also in initial sales of homes not newly constructed,6" resales of relatively
new homes to subsequent purchasers,69 and, in at least one case, sales of
excluded vendor's liability for defective condition that was not readily observable); Frickel v. Sunny-
side Enter., Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986) (implied warranty of habitability did not
apply to sale of apartment complex, especially when contract contained clear and unambiguous
disclaimer). But see Tusch, 113 Idaho at 46, 740 P.2d at 1031 (implied warranty of habitability
applied to sale of duplexes when contract contained only general language that there were no war-
ranties other than those contained within its four comers).
65. See, eg., Frickel, 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422.
66. See, eg., Licciardi v. Pascarella, 194 N.J. Super 381, 476 A.2d 1273 (1983) (discussing
expansive trends in New Jersey).
67. See, e.g., Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Briarcliffe W.
Townhomes Ass'n v. Wiseman Constr. Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 402, 480 N.E.2d 833 (1985). The
homeowners' association has standing to maintain the action against the builder. Briarcliffe, 118 Il.
App. 3d 163, 454 N.E.2d 363.
68. See Gaito v. Auman, 70 N.C. App. 21, 318 S.E.2d 555 (1984) (implied warranty of habita-
bility applied in the first sale of a home by a builder-vendor five years after the house was built). Cf.
Cummings v. Dusenbury, 129 Ill. App. 3d 338, 472 N.E.2d 575 (1984) (implied warranty did not
apply to sale of 10-year-old house that vendors had built and used for a number of years and which
had been inhabited by tenants).
69. Substantial controversy exists regarding the extension of implied warranties to subsequent
purchasers, although the trend appears to be in the direction of eroding the privity requirement. See
Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 134 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427 (1984) (en banc); Blagg v. Fred
Hunt Co., Inc., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441
N.E.2d 324 (1982); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Keyes v.
Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670 (Miss. 1983); Lempke v. Dagenais, 130 N.H. 782, 547 A.2d
290 (1988); Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (1981); Elden v. Simmons, 631
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professionally remodeled older homes.7"
The class of potential defendants has grown broader as well. While
courts have firmly resisted imposing implied warranties on ordinary,
nonbuilding vendors,71 they have imposed the warranty on real estate
P.2d 739 (Okla. 1981); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Gupta v. Ritter
Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo.
1979). See also Gaito, 70 N.C. App. at 29 n.1, 318 S.E.2d at 560 n.1 (dicta). Cf. Tusch 113 Idaho 37,
740 P.2d 1022 (purchaser of commercial building not in privity with contractor can maintain breach
of implied warranty action against contractor); Degnan v. Exec. Homes, Inc., 215 Mont. 162, 696
P.2d 431 (1985) (initial purchaser not in privity with contractor can maintain implied warranty of
habitability action against contractor). But see H.B. Bolas Enter. v. Zarlengo, 156 Colo. 530, 400
P.2d 447 (1965); Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977); Strathmore
Riverside Villas Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Paver Dev. Corp., 369 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App,
1979); Dunant v. Wilmock, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 48, 335 S.E.2d 162 (1985); Fretschel v. Burbank, 351
N.W.2d 403 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974); John
H. Armbruster & Co. v. Hayden Co. Builder-Developer, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
Herz v. Thornwood Acres "D", Inc., 86 Misc. 2d 53, 381 N.Y.S.2d 761, aff'd, 91 Misc. 2d 130, 397
N.Y.S.2d 358 (App. Term 1977); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Bonnie Built Homes, 64 Ohio St. 2d 269, 416
N.E.2d 623 (1980); Arvai v. Shaw, 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986); Brown v. Fowler, 279
N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1980). Cf Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983)
(subsequent purchaser can maintain an action against builder for negligence); Brown, 279 N.W.2d
907 (same). See generally Mallor, Extension of the Implied Warranty of Habitability to Purchasers of
Used Homes, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 361 (1982); Comment, Implied Warranty Protection for Purchasers
of Used Homes: Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 945 (1984); Note, Liability
of Builder-Vendor. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 35 ARK. L. REV. 654 (1982); Case Note, Builder-
Vendor's Broadened Liability for Selecting an Unsafe Homesite: Homeowner's-Seller's Duty to Warn,
ABC Builders, Inc. v. Philips, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 467 (1982); Defective Housing, supra
note 2; Note, Implied Warranty of Habitability-Protection for the Buyer of a Used Home-Privity of
Contract with the Builder not Required, 1982 S. ILL. U.L.J. 447 (1982); Note, Builder's Liability for
Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 STAN, L. REV. 607 (1980); Note, Real Property-Subsequent
Purchasers-Privity Not Necessary Element in Negligence Action Against Builder, 53 U. CIN. L. REV.
801 (1984).
70. Licciardi, 194 N.J. Super. 381, 476 A.2d 1273. But see Sousa v. Albino, 120 R.I. 401, 388
A.2d 804 (1978).
71. Courts have steadfastly refused to apply the implied warranty in sales by "ordinary ven-
dors" or "casual sellers." This is consistent with the supporting rationale that builder-vendors have
superior knowledge of the construction process and materials, ability to avoid defects, and ability to
bear risk. See, eg., Vetor v. Shockey, 414 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Stevens v. Bouchard,
532 A.2d 1028 (Me. 1987); Bernstein v. Ainsworth, 220 Neb. 670, 371 N.W.2d 682 (1985); ABC
Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981). In some cases, courts have refused to apply the
warranty to professional builders who have occupied the house first. See, e.g., Klos v. Gockel, 87
Wash. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976); Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983). See also Hibbler
v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007, 712 P.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1985)(vendors who had acted as their own general
contractor in constructing a trailer park and had hired unlicensed subcontractors were not builder-
vendors for purposes of the implied warranty of habitability because vendors were not in the business
of building or selling property). But see Tusch, 113 Idaho at 48, 740 P.2d at 1033-34 (even though
vendors did not construct duplexes, implied warranty should extend from them if they had construc-
tion expertise and exercised control over the construction); Haskell, supra note 2, at 649-50, 652
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professionals and developers,72 including those who are not mass build-
ers.7" Courts have also expanded the scope of the warranty beyond fit-
ness of the structure and its fixtures to exterior conditions that directly
support the habitability of the house, such as wells and septic tanks.74
(urging that the implied warranty of habitability should exist in every sale of real property without
regard to whether the vendor is a "merchant").
72. See, eg., Jordan v. Talaga, 532 N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (implied warranty of
habitability breached by developer); Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975)
(same).
73. See, eg., Dillig v. Fischer, 142 Ariz. 47, 688 P.2d 693 (Ct. App. 1984) (experienced contrac-
tor currently employed at another job who built house with the intent that his own family occupy it);
Mazurek v. Nielsen, 42 Colo. App. 386, 599 P.2d 269 (1979) (builder constructing his first house);
Degnan v. Executive Homes, Inc., 215 Mont. 162, 696 P.2d 431 (1985) (contractor who was not in
privity with purchasers); Licciardi, 194 N.J. Super. 381, 476 A.2d 1273 (broker and architect who
bought dilapidated structure and remodeled it for resale); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398
A.2d 1283 (1979) (contractor); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979) (same).
See also Tusch 113 Idaho at 48, 740 P.2d at 1034 (issue of material fact existed whether vendor who
had many years of experience in road construction and who contracted with subcontractors and
consulted with contractor regarding site preparation was builder-vendor for purposes of implied
warranty of habitability).
74. Courts usually apply the implied warranty to exterior conditions that are closely linked
with the function of the structure. See Kramp v. Showcase Builders, 97 III. App. 3d 17, 422 N.E.2d
958 (1981) (septic system); Loch Hill Constr. Co., Inc. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 399 A.2d 883 (1979)
(well); Degnan, 215 Mont. 102, 696 P.2d 431 (land underlying building); George v. Veach, 67 N.C.
App. 674, 313 S.E.2d 920 (1984) (septic tank); Lyon v. Ward, 28 N.C. App. 446, 221 S.E.2d 727
(1976) (well); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 298 A.2d 1283 (1979) (potability of water sup-
ply). Courts are less likely to extend implied warranty protection to exterior conditions that bear a
more collateral relationship to the usefulness of the structure, however. See Port Sewall Harbor and
Tennis Club Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. First Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n of Martin County, 463 So. 2d
530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (roads, drainage areas, and footbridge); San Luis Trails Ass'n v. E.M.
Hrris Bldg. Co., Inc., 706 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (streets); Campbell v. Randville Constr.
Corp., 172 N.J. Super. 93, 410 A.2d 1184 (App. Div.), certif denied, 84 N.J. 405, 420 A.2d 325
(1980) (health of trees on property); Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc., 109 Wash.
2d 406, 745 P.2d 1284 (1987) (common areas of condominium such as walkways and decks or
balconies). But see Briarcliffe West Townhouse Owners Ass'n v. Wiseman Constr. Co., 134 Ill. App.
3d 402, 480 N.E.2d 833 (1985) (storm drainage problems causing damage to common land in
planned unit development, interfering with recreational activities on common land); Tassan, 88 Ill.
App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (inadequate drainage of surface waters in front of building).
Courts generally have declined to apply the implied warranty of habitability to vendors of unim-
proved lots, even when the developer created an artificial condition that caused damage to the struc-
ture that was ultimately built on the land. See Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983)
(developers of unimproved lot not liable for damages caused by defective seawall); Bernstein v. Ains-
worth, 220 Neb. 670, 371 N.W.2d 682 (1985) (developer who sold unimproved lot not liable for
damages resulting from overflow of development's manmade lake; seller of vacant lot does not im-
pliedly warrant the suitability of the lot). The rationale for this position is that purchasers of unim-
proved lots are better able to inspect for defects and to bargain for express warranties than are
purchasers of complex structures. See Conklin, 428 So. 2d at 658-59. See also Witty v. Schramm, 62
Ill. App. 3d 185, 379 N.E.2d 333 (1978); Cook v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 279 Or. 333, 569 P.2d
1033 (1977) (implied warranties inapplicable to long-term leases of land; lessor does not warrant that
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These extensions of the warranty all involve consumer-vendees who
have purchased property for their own use. It is not yet clear whether
the expansion of the implied warranty of habitability in consumer cases
will extend to property purchased for commercial or investment
purposes.75
II. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF QUALITY AND COMMERCIAL
PROPERTY: COURTS' DIVERGENT APPROACHES
Despite the volume of commercial property sales transacted each year,
surprisingly few courts have considered whether an implied warranty of
quality should apply in sales of commercial property. Certainly far fewer
disappointed commercial purchasers than residential purchasers have at-
tempted to gain compensation through an implied warranty of quality.
In all probability, the small number of commercial cases reflects that
parties to a commercial property sale generally behave as experienced
businesspersons: they anticipate the possibility of defects, they employ
skilled experts to ferret out potential defects, and they allocate the risk of
defects between the parties through express warranties, disclaimers, and
conditions in their contracts.
The courts that have confronted implied warranty claims by purchas-
ers of commercial property have taken divergent approaches. Some have
rejected the application of the implied warranty, based at least in part on
the purchaser's status as an "income-seeker" rather than a homebuyer.
Not surprisingly, these courts focused on the presumed ability of com-
land fit for construction of residence); Jackson v. River Pines, 276 S.C. 29, 274 S.E.2d 912 (1981).
But see Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969) (developer-
vendor of lot liable for defects in tracts of lots on hillside properties).
75. Most of the courts considering the issue have limited the implied warranty of habitability in
the lease of property to residential tenancies, and have rejected its application to commercial tenan-
cies. See, e.g., Hoban v. Masters, 36 Conn. Super. 611, 421 A.2d 1318 (1980); Gehrke v. Gen.
Theatre Corp., 207 Neb. 301, 298 N.W.2d 773 (1980); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. BPS Co., 23 Ohio
App. 3d 56, 491 N.E.2d 365 (1985). See also Muro v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 229
Cal. Rptr. 383 (1986) (strict liability in tort not applicable to lessor of commercial or industrial
property). But see Four Seas Inv. Corp. v. Int'l Hotel Tenants Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 604, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 531 (1978); Golden v. Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). Cf. Pawco, Inc.
v. Bergman Knitting Mills, Inc., 283 Pa. Super. 443, 424 A.2d 891 (1980) (contract law rather than
property law should be applied to commercial leases, so tenant should be able to defend action for
rent due by alleging landlord's breach of contract). For more detailed discussion of this issue and
challenges to the general rule, see generally Levinson and Silver, Do Commercial Property Tenants
Possess Warranties of Habitability?, 14 REAL. EsT. L.J. 59 (1985); Note, Modernizing Commercial
Lease Law: The Case for an Implied Warranty of Fitness, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 929 (1985).
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mercial purchasers to protect themselves.76 Other courts have applied an
implied warranty to sales of commercial property. Those courts down-
play the purchaser's status and emphasize the applicability of the ration-
ales underlying the creation of the implied warranty." The dispute
centers on the proper role of the caveat emptor doctrine in modem law:
should the doctrine remain the "default position" of our legal system,
allocating risks in the absence of agreement or specific judicial exception,
or should the doctrine be abandoned as a standard for allocating risks?
A. Cases Rejecting the Application of an Implied Warranty
Strikingly, all of the cases rejecting the application of implied warran-
ties to commercial property involve complicating facts that could, in-
dependent of the commercial nature of the property, justify a refusal to
apply warranty protection. Yet, the courts grounded their opinions at
least in part on the fact that the property was purchased for commercial
or speculative purposes, and all of them viewed the implied warranty of
habitability narrowly, as a highly fact-specific exception to the rule of
caveat emptor.78
In Hopkins v. Hartman,79 for example, the Illinois Court of Appeals
held that the rule of caveat emptor is relaxed only for consumers, not for
investors.8 0 In this case, the defendants built a duplex primarily with
their own labor and, after renting it to tenants for two years, sold it to the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs continued to rent out the property for five more
years when they learned of serious structural defects in the duplex.8
They repaired the defects and sued the vendors for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability. The trial court entered judgment for the plain-
tiffs, but the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the
plaintiffs were not within the class of purchasers protected by the
warranty. 2
Citing language from the opinion originally establishing an implied
76. See, e.g., Conklin, 428 So. 2d at 659.
77. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Chin, 168 N.J. Super. 549, 403 A.2d 942 (1979).
78. See, e-g., Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 Il. App. 3d 260, 262, 427 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (1981),
stating that "[t]he warranty created in Petersen is at once a broad one but narrow in its application."
79. 101 Ill. App. 3d 260, 427 N.E.2d 1337 (1981).
80. Id.
81. The floor had begun to sag and pull away from a wall. Inspection of the crawl space re-
vealed that the main supports had nearly rotted away. Repair of these defects cost $5280.28. Id. at
261, 427 N.E.2d at 1338.
82. Id. at 262-63, 425 N.E.2d at 1339.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
322 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 68:305
warranty of habitability in Illinois,8 3 the court stated that the warranty
was designed to protect only the relatively unsophisticated buyer making
a large investment in a structure intended for use as a residence.14 Ac-
cording to the court, a purchaser for investment purposes has ample op-
portunity to investigate and consider the merits of the property and to
make a calculated judgment about how profitable it will be.85 The resi-
dential purchaser, in contrast, often operates under pressure brought
about by job transfer, changed family circumstances, or other factors
over which he has no control.8 6 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that they had relied on the defendants' skill and experience, point-
ing out that they had possessed sufficient opportunity to obtain a second
opinion about the condition of the property. 7
I Although the Hopkins court primarily emphasized the plaintiffs' inves-
tor status, the court could have reached the same result on less sweeping
grounds. That the defendants built the duplex primarily with their own
labor indicates that they were amateurs or casual sellers rather than the
professional sellers to whom the warranty applies.88 The court recited no
facts that would suggest that the defendants were in the business of
building and selling real estate; as a secondary ground for its holding, the
court noted the defendants had built and used the property for their own
income-producing purposes and not for resale.8 9 In several other cases,
83. Id., quoting passage from Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Il1. 2d 31, 40, 389 N.E.2d
1154, 1158 (1979):
Many new houses are, in a sense, now mass produced. The vendee buys in many instances
from a model home or from predrawn plans .... The vendee is making a major invest-
ment, in many instances the largest single investment of his life .... The vendee has the
right to expect to receive that for which he has bargained and that which the builder-
vendor has agreed to construct and convey to him, that is, a house that is reasonably fit for
use as a residence.
84. 101 Ill. App. 3d at 262-63, 427 N.E.2d at 1339.
85. Id. The court stated that if. the warranty were extended to an investor in real estate, by
extension of logic the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange should warrant that no
common stock traded there will ever decrease in value. Id. Note, however, that the plaintiffs in
Hopkins complained that the property was defective, not that its value decreased because of chang-
ing market conditions.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. For discussion of courts' refusals to impose implied warranties on casual sellers, see supra
note 71.
89. As an alternative ground for refusing to extend implied warranty protection to the plain-
tiffs, the court pointed to the fact that the defendants had built the duplex for their own use rather
than building and marketing the structure in the manner in which merchandise is sold. Hopkins, 101
Ill. App. 3d at 263, 427 N.E.2d at 1339. The implied rationale for this distinction is that there is no
compelling reason to abolish the caveat emptor doctrine because (1) the building of a structure by a
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the fact that a builder built the property for his own use prevented the
application of implied warranties, even for residential property. 90 In ad-
dition, the property had been rented for seven years when the repairs
became necessary. Because rental property is often subjected to more
wear and tear than owner-occupied property, the court could have con-
cluded that a reasonable time had elapsed and that the implied warranty
of habitability was no longer effective. 91
In another commercial property case, Hays v. Gilliam,92 the Tennessee
Court of Appeals held that no implied warranty of habitability existed in
the sale of a renovated apartment building. The defendant in Hays had
rebuilt a fifteen-year-old single family house that had been destroyed by
fire, modifying it over a period of years into a six-unit apartment build-
ing.93 After purchasing the building and taking possession, the plaintiff
discovered that the sewage system and some of the electrical wiring were
significantly inadequate. He brought an action for breach of implied
warranty, and the trial court awarded him damages.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding that no implied
warranties existed under these circumstances because an implied war-
ranty of habitability applied in the sale of new and not-yet-constructed
dwellings." The court distinguished one who purchases a remodeled
structure from one who purchases a new structure because the latter
lacks knowledge about the way in which the structure was built and has
no opportunity to observe how it will stand the passage of time.95
In addition, the court distinguished the plaintiff's case from those to
defendant who plans to use it himself rather than resell it is not analogous to the mass production
and marketing of goods, and (2) it is unlikely that a builder who builds for his own uses would be
tempted to cheat himself by using shabby construction and materials.
90. Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007, 712 P.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1985); Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash.
2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976); Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983).
91. For discussion of the duration of the implied warranty of habitability, see supra note 47.
92. 655 S.W.2d 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
93. The contract of sale contained no warranties or representations about the quality of the
property. Id. at 159.
94. The Hays court adopted the implied warranty of habitability as formulated by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974). The court also
cited Dixon v. Mountain Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1982), a previous Tennessee case
involving the sale of a house still under construction at the time of contracting. Hays, 655 S.W.2d at
160.
95. 655 S.W.2d at 160 (quoting Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 648, 525 P.2d 88 (1974)). Note, however, that the Pollard court recognized an implied war-
ranty of quality when the plaintiff had purchased income-producing property. See infra notes 123-27
and accompanying text.
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which the implied warranty applies on the ground that the plaintiff had
purchased the property as an investment, and thus was not a "naive
home buyer."'9 6 The court took the position that such a purchaser has
the responsibility to use all means of self-protection at his disposal. The
plaintiff could and should have inquired about the condition of sewage
facilities and any other construction that could not be examined, and
should have demanded assurances about the quality of the property.97
The court also was concerned that extending implied warranties for the
protection of investors such as the plaintiff would create "a morass of
controversy and uncertainty through which no clear, reliable road may
be charted."98 The court thus concluded that the case fell squarely
within the rule of caveat emptor.99
The relative knowledge, sophistication, and bargaining power of the
parties was also a central issue in Conklin v. Hurley.1" In Conklin, the
purchasers of waterfront building lots brought suit against the developer
of the lots for breach of the implied warranty of habitability when the
seawall the developer had constructed collapsed. The plaintiffs had
purchased the lots with the intent to resell them to other investors or
homebuilders. Although the trial court found that the developer
breached an implied warranty of habitability, the Florida Supreme Court
disagreed. It held that the implied warranty did not extend to the facts
of this case for two reasons10 1: the warranty does not apply to developed
but unimproved land 10 2 and the plaintiffs were investors. 10 3 The court
stated that "[t]hose who speculate in land, as a class, simply do not need
the sort of protection" 1" that the implied warranty of habitability af-
fords, because people who regularly trade in the real estate market enjoy
a stronger bargaining position than do homebuyers. 105 According to the
96. 655 S.W.2d at 160-61.
97. Id. at 161.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983).
101. The Florida Court of Appeals had certified the following question to the court: "Do im-
plied warranties of fitness and merchantability extend to first purchasers of residential real estate for
improvements to the land other than construction of a home and other improvements immediately
supporting the residence thereon, such as water wells and septic tanks?" Id. at 655 (citing Hurley v.
Conklin, 409 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
102. 428 So. 2d at 659. See supra note 74.
103. 428 So. 2d at 659. Apparently the court of appeals did not certify this question to the
supreme court.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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court, an investor can always choose to invest his excess capital else-
where. In contrast, the typical family looking for a residence is seeking a
basic necessity and often is pressured by time constraints and career de-
mands.10 6 The court presumed that investors are likely to be more
knowledgeable about real estate and that the economic consequences of
buying defective real estate are likely to be less disastrous for the investor
than for the homebuyer. 107 It concluded that the loss of expectancy ex-
perienced by these investors was not the sort of loss courts intended to
protect against by creating the implied warranty of habitability.108
The presence of a disclaimer clause in the sales contract was a compli-
cating factor in the Washington Supreme Court's recent decision in
Frickel v. Sunnyside Enterprises, Inc. °9 In this case, the plaintiffs-seek-
ing an investment that would give them retirement income-approached
the defendant builder and property manager ° about purchasing a par-
tially completed apartment complex that the defendant was in the pro-
cess of building for its own ownership and management.III The plaintiffs
were unsophisticated investors in real estate; their only other purchase
had been the acquisition of their home thirty years earlier.1 2 The parties
reached an agreement and executed a contract containing a clause ac-
knowledging that the seller made no covenants respecting the conditions
of any structures and stating that the purchaser assumed the hazard of
damage to or destruction of any structure.
Four years later, some problems developed with outside stairways.
Three years after that, the plaintiffs learned that the foundations were
inadequate and improperly designed. Extensive repairs were necessary at
a cost of $330,000 to prevent a foundation failure.1 3 The plaintiffs then
brought an action against the defendant for breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability and the trial court entered judgment in their favor.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington framed the issue nar-
rowly, asking whether a builder of an apartment complex built for the
builder's own inventory rather than for resale guarantees to an unsolic-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986) (en banc).
110. Sunnyside had built more than 100 units for itself. Id. at 715, 725 P.2d at 423.
111. The complex consisted of five buildings, four of which had been in use for some time and
the last of which had just been framed in. Id.
112. Id. at 728, 725 P.2d at 430 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting).
113. The normal life expectancy of such buildings is 50 to 60 years. Id. at 716, 725 P.2d at 424.
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ited buyer that the buildings sold are free from design errors.1 14 The
court's first objection to applying the implied warranty of habitability
was that the defendants were not merchant-type sellers and the plaintiffs
were not consumer-type buyers.1 15
The court implied that because the defendants did not build the struc-
ture for the purpose of resale, the sale was a "casual or personal" one.I16
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, were investors rather than buyers of a
new home. Caveat emptor, said the court, is premised on the existence of
an "arm's length transaction between buyers and sellers of comparable
skill and experience." '117 The implied warranty of habitability is an ex-
ception that has been carved out of caveat emptor when there is a dispar-
ity of skill and experience between the parties, a situation exemplified by
the relationship between a new home buyer and a builder-vendor.' For
the new home buyer, judicial intervention is necessary because such a
buyer is not usually knowledgeable in construction practices and is
forced to rely upon the skill and integrity of the builder1l 9 The court
noted that even though the plaintiffs were relatively inexperienced inves-
tors in commercial property, they had sought out the property and were
counseled by a lawyer.1 20 The Frickel court concluded that they could
and should have protected themselves by inspection and contract
negotiations. 121
The disclaimer language in the contract also persuaded the court that
it should not impose a warranty because the allocation of risks had been
the subject of an express contractual provision. The court found the dis-
claimer enforceable, even though it was "boilerplate." 1" While the court
made clear that it was not stating that implied warranties can never at-
tach to the sale of an apartment complex, it concluded that it saw no
reason to impose a guarantee on the sellers when neither party negotiated
114. Id.
115. Id. at 717-20, 725 P.2d at 424-25.
116. Id. at 718, 725 P.2d at 424-25.
117. Id. at 719, 725 P.2d at 425.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 720, 725 P.2d at 425.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 721, 725 P.2d at 426. Accord Shapiro v. Hu, 188 Cal. App. 3d 324, 233 Cal. Rptr
470 (1987) ("as is" clause enforceable in sale of used commercial property).
Generally, boilerplate disclaimers are not enforced in cases concerning residential property. See
Abney, supra note 52, at 147-48. See also supra notes 57-62.
[Vol. 68:305
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss2/3
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE SALES
for or expected such a guarantee. 123
The central message of Hopkins, Hays, and Frickel is that investors
have the ability to protect themselves against defects in building con-
struction and do not need the protection of implied warranties. Such
purchasers have the means and the leisure to inspect the property fully,
the sophistication to recognize the existence of a defective condition, the
bargaining power to negotiate a favorable express warranty term, and, if
all of the above fail, the capital to absorb a loss that would be ruinous to
ordinary homebuyers.
B. Cases Applying Implied Warranties to Sales of Commercial
Property
Courts imposing an implied warranty of quality in sales of commercial
property emphasize the similarities between the residential cases estab-
lishing the implied warranty and the commercial cases. To these courts,
the commercial purchaser's ability to protect himself is not significantly
superior to that of the ordinary home buyer.
Interestingly, one of the earlier and more influential cases noting the
existence of the implied warranty of habitability involved a sale of in-
come-producing property. In Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development
Co.,124 a purchaser of five apartment buildings brought suit against the
developer of the units because of significant defects he noticed when he
took possession.
The California Supreme Court ultimately held that the purchaser's ac-
tion was barred by his failure to give timely notice of the defect.125 In
broad dicta that made no distinction between commercial and residential
property, however, the court stated that builders and sellers of new con-
struction should be held to their implied representation "that the com-
pleted structure was designed and constructed in a reasonably
123. Frickel, 106 Wash. 2d 714, 720, 725 P.2d 422, 426.
124. 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974).
125. The plaintiff waited more than three years after learning of the defects to give notice of the
defects to the developer. The court observed that the notice requirement applicable to warranty
actions under § 2-605 of the UCC serves a number of sound commercial purposes: allowing the
defendant to repair the item, reducing damages, avoiding the selling of defective products in the
future, negotiating settlements, and protecting against stale claims. The court determined that this
notice requirement applied by analogy to warranty actions involving defective real property, and
held that the plaintiffs' unreasonable delay in giving notice of defect barred their cause of action for
breach of warranty. Id. at 380, 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
328 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
workmanlike manner." 12 6  This implied warranty is justified by the
buyer's reliance on the seller's skill and judgment, the seller's presumed
knowledge, and the ordinary expectations of the parties. 27 The court
emphasized the buyer's inability to inspect the property without dis-
turbing the finished product and the construction trade's understanding
of this reliance. 128
In a more recent case, Hodgson v. Chin, 29 the plaintiffs approached
the defendant about buying his building and the parties later entered a
contract for the sale of the building.13° The purchasers discovered a
number of construction defects when they took title to the property and
brought suit for breach of warranty. Affirming the trial court's judgment
for the plaintiffs, the New Jersey appellate court found that the applica-
tion of implied warranties to the sale of this commercial building was a
logical extension of the precedents creating the warranty in sales of resi-
dential structures.1 3 1 The court emphasized that the buyers in this case
were small business persons who were obviously buying in reliance on
the building being fit for its intended use.1 3
2
The most sweeping opinion extending the implied warranty to income-
producing property is Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin.133 Prior to purchasing
three duplexes, the plaintiff inspected them and noticed no major defects.
About one month after the sale, however, significant structural defects
became apparent. The plaintiff brought a breach of warranty action
against the vendor of the units134 and the contractor who built them.
126. Id. at 380, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651. Note that this warranty is not one of
habitability, but of sound design of the property.
127. Id. at 379, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
128. Id.
129. 168 N.J. Super. 549, 403 A.2d 942 (1979).
130. The Chins rejected the first proposed contract, which contained an "as is" clause. The
parties finally settled on a contract that guaranteed the roof, plumbing, and heating systems for one
year. Id. at 551-52, 403 A.2d at 943.
131. Id. at 555, 403 A.2d at 945.
132. Id. The court.noted that a different result might apply in the sale of a large commercial
building. Id.
133. 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987).
134. Though the vendor, Vander Boegh, might seem to be a nonbuilding vendor and thus ex-
empt from the application of the implied warranty of habitability, the court pointed out that he had
many years of experience in road construction and that the contractor, Coffin, relied on his expertise
in preparing the site. Vander Boegh also contracted with Coffin as well as subcontractors and peri-
odically visited the site during the construction phase and consulted with Coffin about the use of fill
dirt on the site. The court found that there was at least a question of fact about whether Vander
Boegh was a builder-vendor. Id. at 48-49, 740 P.2d at 1033-34.
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
and the plaintiff appealed.
Although the sales contract in Tusch contained disclaimer and merger
clauses, 35 the Idaho Supreme Court held that the disclaimer was ineffec-
tive. The court observed that the implied warranty of habitability is a
creature of public policy, and can be waived only when the vendor proves
that the purchaser knowingly waived the warranty.1 36 The purported
waiver of the implied warranty in this case was ineffective because it did
not mention the warranty of habitability by name and contained only
general language stating that there were no warranties other than those
contained in the four corners of the document. 137
The court next considered whether an investor-buyer was within the
class of persons who may maintain an implied warranty of habitability
action. It refused to restrict the implied warranty to buyers who person-
ally reside in dwellings after they purchase them. 138  The Tusch court
stated that the identity of the person who inhabits the structure is unim-
portant because the implied warranty requires that the structure be fit for
habitation. 139  The fundamental question whether the buyer received
what he bargained for depends on the quality of the dwelling and the
expectations of the parties, not the status of the buyer as ultimate user. 140
The court pointed out that the UCC warranty sections do not distinguish
between buyers who purchase goods for their own use and buyers who
135. The real estate contract provided:
12. EXCLUSIVE TERMS: This contract is the entire agreement between the parties
and all other agreements heretofore entered into, either written or oral, are hereby either
abrogated or contained in this agreement. All prior oral agreements and conditions are
expressly waived unless stated in this agreement and the parties expressly understand they
have no mutual understanding or agreement other than as herein set forth.
13. WARRANTIES: The Purchasers have fully inspected the above described prem-
ises and know just exactly what they are purchasing. Sellers warrant that they have a good
and sufficient title, and that the premises have no code violations or governmental restric-
tions as of May 15, 1979, and that further as of May 15, 1979, Sellers warrant that they
know of no defects in the sewers, plumbing, electrical items, and mechanical items in and
about the property. Other than as set forth in this paragraph, Sellers make no further
warranties with regard to the condition of the sewer lines, utility poles, fences, curbs, side-
walks, streets, patios or any other mechanical item of any description whatsoever within
the described premises.
Id. at 44, 740 P.2d at 1029.
136. Id. at 46, 740 P.2d at 1031. Other courts have required proof of the purchaser's subjective
knowledge of a disclaimer term. See supra note 60.
137. Id. at 46, 740 P.2d at 1031.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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purchase goods for income, and stated that it saw no reason to afford
greater protection to purchasers of chattels than to purchasers of real
property. 141
The court in Tusch also rejected the contention that it should deny the
plaintiff implied warranty protection because investor-buyers can more
easily hire experts to evaluate buildings prior to purchase.142 Given that
the implied warranty of habitability covers only latent defects that mani-
fest themselves after purchase, the expertise or sophistication of the pur-
chaser is relevant only to determining whether a defect should be
considered latent. 143 The court stated that it is unrealistic to expect buy-
ers to consult geotechnical and other experts about defects that are not
apparent. 144 Noting that the builder created the defect and had the supe-
rior ability to avoid it,1 45 the court held that the implied warranty of
habitability applied under the facts of this case."
The courts that have extended the implied warranty of habitability to
sales of commercial property as in Tusch and Hodgson have emphasized
the protection of the purchaser's reasonable expectations. These courts
reject the assumption that purchasers of commercial property have the
ability to protect those expectations by inspecting the property and bar-
gaining for contractual protection. This is especially true in sales of rela-
tively modest commercial properties purchased by individuals or small
entities.147 The courts applying the warranty impliedly recognize that
there may be a vast difference among purchasers of commercial property
in their ability to protect their expectations under a contract.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 47, 740 P.2d at 1032.
143. Id. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 651, cited with approval in Tusch, 113 Idaho at 47 n.6, 740
P.2d at 1032 n.6.
144. 113 Idaho at 47, 740 P.2d at 1032.
145. Id.
146. Id. The court limited the holding to the facts before it, stating that the implied warranty
extends to residential dwellings purchased for income-producing purposes which have never been
occupied by the buyers. Id.
147. In Hodgson v. Chin, the court emphasized that the plaintiffs were small businesspersons
and specifically reserved judgment on whether the warranty would be extended to large commercial
buildings. 168 N.J. Super 549, 555, 403 A.2d 942, 945 (1979). See also Chubb Group of Ins. Co. v.
C.F. Murphy & Assoc., 656 S.W.2d 766, 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (implied warranty of habitability
not applicable in action by tenants not in privity with builder of large commercial building).
[Vol. 68:305
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss2/3
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE SALES
III. THE CASE FOR AN IMPLIED WARRANTY IN SALES OF
COMMERCIAL PROPERTY
In considering whether to impose an implied warranty of quality in
sales of new commercial property, courts must determine the extent to
which commercial parties should be held responsible for protecting their
own interests. Courts that reject the application of the warranty con-
clude that these purchasers, unlike homebuyers, assume the risk of latent
defects when they contract. The crucial factor in this allocation of risks
has been the status of the purchaser. The commercial nature of the prop-
erty did not lower the purchaser's expectations. Rather, the assumed
characteristics of commercial purchasers persuaded the courts that there
was no compelling reason to provide legal protection to these purchasers'
expectations of receiving property free of hidden defects. However, this
Article contends that differences between residential and commercial
purchasers do not justify the extension of warranty to the former group
but not the latter.
A. Rationales Supporting the Imposition of an Implied Warranty in
the Sale of New Commercial Property
Although a disappointed purchaser of commercial property might not
elicit as much sympathy from courts as a hapless homebuyer, the ratio-
nales underlying the recognition and expansion of an implied warranty of
habitability in sales of residential property apply with equal force to sales
of commercial property.
Purchasers of commercial property, like buyers of residential property,
are forced to rely on the skill and expertise of the builder or developer of
their property to the extent that they are unable to discover defects in the
property. Such a purchaser may be more likely than a residential pur-
chaser to have the means to employ a trained expert to examine the prop-
erty prior to purchase. However, even a sophisticated commercial party
likely would not hire an independent expert to examine new construc-
tion, because the purchaser's reasonable expectations about the quality of
new construction are usually high. Furthermore, completion of the
structure limits what even a trained expert can discover. Significant de-
fects may exist in the foundation or sealed elements of the structure and
go undiscovered by an expert.1 48 This problem is especially true of larger
and more complicated commercial property, such as a high-rise apart-
148. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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ment building or retail complex. As in sales of residential property, the
builder-vendor is in the best position to know the methods and materials
used in the construction.
Not only does a builder-vendor have superior knowledge about the
structure and superior ability to avoid defects, in many cases the builder-
vendor will also be a superior risk bearer because he is in a position to
carry insurance against his errors and omissions. The purchaser may not
be insured for the particular defect. While a commercial purchaser can
pass on repair costs to tenants, clients, or customers, this puts the pur-
chaser-who did not cause the defect-at a competitive disadvantage in
the marketplace. There seems little reason to place the burden on the
purchaser, even a relatively sophisticated purchaser, for defects caused
by an equally sophisticated builder-vendor.
Many purchasers of commercial property may be able to protect them-
selves against the risk of latent defects by negotiating express warranties
or favorable prices. However, bargaining power and sophistication about
legal matters varies widely among commercial parties. That the plaintiffs
in the cases discussed earlier did not attempt to bargain for express war-
ranties and, in some cases, signed contracts with "boilerplate" disclaim-
ers suggests that many buyers of commercial property are little more
sophisticated about warranty protection and exclusion than the ordinary
homebuyer. Although several courts have said that a buyer of commer-
cial property has more bargaining power than a typical homebuyer, 149
that assertion depends on factors such as the purchaser's reason for
purchasing the commercial property, the market for the property, and
the characteristics of the individual purchaser.
In addition, application of an implied warranty of quality is necessary
to facilitate the commercial purchaser's reasonable expectations. Such
purchasers, like purchasers of residential property, expect that they will
receive that for which they bargained and paid: a structure free of hid-
den defects that prevent its use for its intended purposes. Nothing sug-
gests that these expectations are different because the property is
purchased to produce income rather than to provide a home.
Application of an implied warranty of habitability in sales of commer-
cial property also would encourage a higher standard of quality in con-
struction of commercial buildings and higher standards of ethical
dealings between the parties in commercial transactions. The need to
149. See, e.g., Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 659 (Fla. 1983).
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encourage minimum standards of good workmanship in residential struc-
tures purchased for investment purposes and leased to tenants is obvious.
Reasonable standards of habitability are just as important to the person
who leases a house or apartment as to the person who purchases the
structure. Courts should encourage builder-vendors of commercial prop-
erty to meet such standards because the health and safety of the person
occupying the structure, including employees who occupy a nonresiden-
tial commercial structure, should be protected. To deny that protection
to the ultimate user of the structure because the owner purchased the
property for investment purposes makes little sense.
In addition, just as the analogy between the buyer of goods and pur-
chaser of new homes supported the creation of the implied warranty of
habitability,"'0 the analogy between the UCC's implied warranty of
merchantability and the implied warranty of habitability supports the ap-
plication of similar protection in the sale of commercial property. The
UCC provides that the warranty of merchantability is implied in every
contract for the sale of goods by a merchant seller. 1 1 Although some
provisions of the UCC distinguish between a merchant and nonmerchant
buyer,152 the warranty of merchantability applies regardless of the char-
acteristics of the buyer. The implied warranty of habitability reflects a
belief that purchasers of real property should be entitled to as much pro-
tection as the purchaser of goods. There is no reason to limit warranty
protection to a particular "consumer" class of purchasers and deny that
protection to "merchant-like" investment purchasers in the sale of real
property. As in the sale of goods, courts should focus upon the product,
not the purchaser.
Courts should not assume that there is a relevant distinction between
purchasers who invest in commercial property and "simple, gullible folks
unable to protect themselves."' 53 People who buy real property for busi-
ness purposes vary widely in their experience, knowledge, sophistication,
bargaining power, wealth, and access to outside advisers and experts.' 54
Some courts seem to consider commercial property to be, by definition, a
luxury rather than a necessity. 155 In fact, many who purchase commer-
150. See, eg., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Conyers v. Molloy, 50
Ill. App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (1977).
151. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987).
152. See, eg., U.C.C. §§ 2-209(2), 2-207(2), and 2-205 (1987).
153. Standard Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Johnstun, 285 F.2d. 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1960).
154. See Mallor, supra note 63, at 1074-87 (1986).
155. See, e.g., Conklin, 428 So. 2d at 659 (the investor enjoys a stronger bargaining position than
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cial property do so to earn a livelihood.15 6 Furthermore, the rationales
underlying recognition of the implied warranty suggest that, as a policy
matter, purchasers of commercial property, like those who purchase resi-
dential property, should be entitled to receive that for which they bar-
gain: property that is safe and habitable, and that meets reasonable
standards of good workmanship. New construction developed or sold by
one in the business of selling real property should be accompanied by an
implied warranty of quality, irrespective of the type of property involved
or the purchaser's motive for buying the property.
B. Application of the Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of
Commercial Property
In the commercial property context, the implied warranty of quality
should be viewed as a warranty of habitability for residential property
purchased for investment purposes, and as a warranty of good workman-
ship for nonresidential property. 57 Although sound policy supports the
application of an implied warranty to sales of all types of new construc-
tion, sales of commercial property are likely to pose some special
challenges.
It is probably no accident that most commercial property implied war-
ranty cases involve relatively small business and investment concerns.
An implied warranty of quality is likely to have more importance for
small businesses than for large corporations. A sophisticated, exper-
ienced, and wealthy purchaser is more likely to have legal counsel at its
disposal. A sale of commercial property to such a party usually will be
attended by intense inspection and legal scrutiny. 158  Attorneys repre-
senting the parties are likely to bargain for warranties or disclaimers of
warranties, and liability for latent defects is likely to be one of the risks
contemplated and provided for in the contract of sale. As a result, the
the homebuyer; the typical family buying a home is buying a necessity, while the investor can always
choose to invest his excess capital elsewhere).
156. See, eg., Hodgson v. Chin, 168 N.J. Super. 549, 403 A.2d 942 (1979) (small businessper-
sons bought property for relocation of their Chinese take-out restaurant and gift shop).
157. See Frickel v. Sunnyside Enter., Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 733, 725 P.2d 422, 432 (1986) (en
banc) (Pearson, C.J., dissenting) (claim of commercial property purchaser is analogous to claim for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability); Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 I11. App. 3d 260, 262,
427 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (1981) (warranty of habitability approaches one of merchantability). See
generally Haskell, supra note 2.
158. This is not always the case, however. See, eg., Fairmont Foods Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 616
S.W.2d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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determination of whether contractual disclaimers of the warranty are en-
forceable is likely to become a crucial issue in resolving implied warranty
cases between vendors and purchasers of commercial property.
Courts traditionally have recognized that sellers and buyers of equal
bargaining power should be able to allocate the risks associated with the
sale of property. This should continue to be true with disclaimers of
implied warranties in the sale of commercial property. Although courts
usually apply exacting standards for an effective disclaimer of the im-
plied warranty of habitability with respect to residential property, 15 9
courts should relax those standards with sophisticated and knowledgea-
ble commercial property purchasers, such as large corporations. For ex-
ample, although "as is" disclaimers are usually ineffective to disclaim the
implied warranty of habitability in sales of new residences, 160 a conspicu-
ous clause using such a commonly understood commercial term should
be sufficient against a commercial party who is truly knowledgeable and
experienced and who is represented by counsel. However, when the par-
ties are of unequal stature, unconscionability standards sensitive to the
individual buyer's sophistication, experience, bargaining power, and
knowledge should be used to determine whether a disclaimer should be
enforced. 161
In the absence of an effective contractual disclaimer of implied warran-
ties, an implied warranty of quality should exist in sales of new commer-
cial property. The rationales underlying imposition of an implied
warranty of habitability in the sale of residential property apply with
equal force to the sale of new commercial property. The law should pro-
tect the purchaser's expectations without regard to the size or expertise
of the purchaser. The builder-vendor should be responsibile for latent
defects in the property as he is in the best position to know about and
bear the risk for such defects.
While courts should impose an implied warranty of quality in the sale
of new commercial property, they should continue to limit the protection
afforded by the warranty to latent defects. Courts should consider the
sophistication, knowledge, and expertise of the purchaser in determining
whether a particular defect is latent or should have been discovered upon
inspection. As a result, powerful corporate purchasers will be protected
only against those defects that are beyond the range of their reasonable
159. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
160. See Abney, supra note 52, at 148.
161. See Mallor, supra note 63, at 1085-88.
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inspection.' 62 In light of the high expectations purchasers have about
new construction, however, courts should not place an unreasonable
burden on the purchaser of commercial property to investigate and dis-
cover defects which are not readily observable. The responsibility for
nonobservable defects in the sale of new commercial property should rest
upon the builder-vendor, regardless of the relative sophistication of the
purchaser.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most courts today protect purchasers of residential property by impos-
ing a judicially created warranty of habitability in the sale of a new home.
The judicial trend is toward expansion of the warranty to the sale of used
homes and to subsequent purchasers. By placing an extracontractual
duty on sellers in the business of selling real property to supply structures
that meet reasonable standards of construction and are fit for their ordi-
nary purpose, the courts recognize the need to enforce the reasonable
expectations of the parties, as well as acknowledge the purchaser's neces-
sary reliance on the builder's superior knowledge and skill. Imposition
of a warranty of habitability also ensures minimum standards of safety
and quality in housing. While the warranty in the sale of new housing
appears firmly established, some courts have refused to extend an implied
warranty to the sale of commercial property on the theory that commer-
cial investors can protect themselves through investigating the property
and obtaining express warranties in the contract.
Upon closer examination, however, the policies underlying imposition
of a warranty of habitability in sales of residential property also apply in
sales of commercial property. Many commercial investors are infrequent
and relatively unsophisticated purchasers who rely on the seller's knowl-
edge and expertise. They are not unlike purchasers of residential prop-
erty who "invest" in their property by reselling and upgrading their
homes through a succession of sales and purchases. Even in commercial
property transactions between large businesses, the builder-vendor often
will have superior knowledge of possible defects in the structure which
may be unobservable or undiscoverable by the purchaser. Many defects,
such as defects in the foundation, are undetectable after the structure is
completed. Inspection is also more difficult because commercial struc-
tures such as apartment buildings and office buildings are usually much
162. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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larger and more complex than the average home. A purchaser of com-
mercial property may be experienced and sophisticated in legal matters
and thus able to protect himself against latent defects by express warran-
ties in the contract. However, courts should only enforce disclaimers of
the implied warranty based on standards of unconscionability that ad-
dress the specific knowledge, experience, and bargaining power of the
purchaser, and circumstances surrounding the transaction.
Imposition of an implied warranty of quality in the sale of commercial
property is supported by those policies underlying the retreat from the
caveat emptor doctrine in sales of residential property. An implied war-
ranty would ensure that the purchaser of such property, like the pur-
chaser of residential property, can expect to get that for which he
bargains. An implied warranty would require that the seller bear the risk
of defects and help guarantee a minimum standard of reasonable con-
struction in commercial buildings. Some courts have been willing to ex-
tend these protections to the purchasers of commercial property. Other
courts should continue the trend.
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